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Orthodox Jewish Prisoners and the Turner Effect
I. INTRODUCTION
Problems often arise when an inmate's desire to participate in a religious
practice conflicts with prison regulations. The tension occurs between prison
regulations restricting prisoners' rights and the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution' protecting those rights. Orthodox
Jewish prisoners have had various problems with prison regulations prohibiting
or curtailing certain of their religious practices. These prisoners have desired
specific areas for prayer in,2 constant wearing of a yarmulke,3 or even specific
fabric necessary for their prison uniforms.4 Paramount among these practices
are the keeping of the Jewish dietary laws and the growing of beards without
cutting or trimming. Both practices have their roots in the Five Books of Moses,
the Torah, and have been observed by many Jews, especially Orthodox Jews, for
centuries.' Prison officials have difficulty catering to prisoners who wish to
keep the dietary or kosher laws because food choices in prison are limited and
special, kosher food preparation methods are impracticable. Likewise, respecting
the religious restriction against trimming beards is difficult because it allegedly
hampers prison officials' quick and certain identification of prisoners.
This comment will explore the different claims raised by Orthodox Jewish
prisoners in relation to these two religious practices. The analysis will focus on
two periods on the jurisprudential timeline: Part II of the comment will
concentrate on the cases decided before the seminal Turner v. Safle9 decision
and Part III will examine those decisions after Turner. Contrasts will be drawn
between the various standards for constitutionality used in these two different
"periods," as well as the results produced by the different standards. Part IV of
the comment will consider the constitutionality of the Turner standard,
questioning the standard's effectiveness in evaluating Free Exercise claims, the
Supreme Court's reasoning in granting almost complete deference to prison
officials, and the standard's result in totally depriving Orthodox Jewish prisoners
of their most essential religious practices. Part V will discuss the recent
Religious Freedom Restoration Act7 and how it will affect the rights of these
prisoners.
Copyright 1996, by LouisLQJA LAW REvIEw.
1. U.S. Const. amend. I.: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
2. Glasshofer v. Thomburgh, 514 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D. Penn. 1981).
3. Young v. Lane, 733 F. Supp. 1205 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
4. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
5. See discussion in Section II.A. 1. and B. I., infra.
6. 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
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II. PRE-TURNER STANDARDS AND OuTcoMES
Before analysis of the jurisprudence can begin, the origins and importance
of kashrut? and the prohibition against shaving must be considered. This
Section explores the history of both practices and then delves into the jurispru-
dence affecting these issues. The case law will reveal favorable results to those
inmates who challenged prison restrictions which curtailed their religious
practices.
A. Kashrut
1. Biblical Origins
Like most other Jewish practices, the rules concerning Kashrut, or keeping
kosher, are found in the Five Books of Moses, or Torah." Three of the Five
Books, Exodus, Leviticus, and Deuteronomy, include significant passages
regarding kashrut.
Kashrut is first mentioned in the Torah in the Book of Exodus, which
contains the story of the emancipation of the ancient Hebrews from Egyptian
slavery by Moses. After pronouncing the Ten Commandments,0 God directed:
"And ye shall be holy men unto Me; therefore ye shall not eat any flesh that is
torn of beasts in the field; ye shall cast it to the dogs."" This passage, though
somewhat cryptic, foreshadows the dietary rules to come in the later Books by
condemning "any flesh that is torn of beasts," or the eating of "unclean" animals,
as an unholy practice.
Exodus also contains two identical references to the prohibition of
consuming meat with milk: "Thou shall not seethe a kid in its mother's
milk."" There are three prohibitions that extend from this passage. Milk and
meat are not to be cooked together, eaten together, or mixed together in any
way.' 3  Separate utensils must be used for milk and meat products, and the
utensils must also be cleaned and stored separately. 4
The Book of Leviticus is the true keeper of the kosher laws. Leviticus is the
primary source of the Judaic law, or halacah. Leviticus provides the basic
structure of halacah, discussing laws ranging from burnt offerings to the duty of
8. Kashrut is the practice of keeping kosher, i.e., the Jewish dietary laws.
9. The Torah, also known as the Pentateuch, is regarded by most non-Jews as the "Old
Testament," describing the covenant between God and the Jewish people. The "New Testament," in
contrast, contains works describing the life of Jesus Christ, his teachings, and the works of his disciples.
10. Exodus 20:3-14.
11. Exodus 22:31.
12. Exodus 23:19 and 34:26.
13. Gerald F. Masoudi, Kosher Food Regulation and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 667, 669 (1993). See generally 6 Encyclopaedia Judaica 26 (Dietary
Laws) (Keter Publishing, 1971).
14. Masoudi, supra note 13, at 669.
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the priests to medical treatment of plagues. Here, the laws of kashrut are clearly
defined. Leviticus 11 decrees animals that are not cloven-footed, and that do not
chew their cud, are "unclean," and not to be consumed.S Thus, pork, hare and
camel products are to be avoided because they do not possess the two above-
mentioned attributes. 6 Other restrictions involving animals forbidden for
consumption follow. Sea animals that have neither fins nor scales cannot be
eaten, thus excluding all shellfish and other aquatic life such as shark, catfish,
and eel. 7 Although bird such as chicken, duck, and turkey may be consumed,
fowl such as eagle and hawk may not.S "Swarming things that swarm upon
the earth," such as rodents and lizards, are also deemed unclean."9 Leviticus
even dictates rules for keeping vessels, ovens, and pottery clean after coming into
contact with unclean animals.2
The Book of Deuteronomy, known for containing the last words of Moses
spoken to the ancient Hebrews, also provides some additions to kashrut. In
particular, Deuteronomy prohibits eating the blood of animals:
Notwithstanding thou mayest kill and eat flesh within all thy gates, after
all the desire of thy soul ... Only ye shall not eat the blood; thou shall
poor it upon the earth as water ... for the blood is the life, and thou
shalt not eat the life with the flesh.2
Deuteronomy explains the "life" of the animal, or the blood, is to be given to
God in the burnt-offering ritual.22 Today, a special type of slaughtering method
ensures compliance with this prohibition. A shotel, or special slaughterer, is
trained to cut an animal's arteries and windpipe with one stroke, so that the
blood drains quickly from the flesh.23
At first glance, kashrut seems to be linked to old rituals dealing with health
concerns. Some modem commentators disagree with this explanation:
The most common misconception regarding Kashrut is that it is an
ancient health measure which may have had its place in antiquity, but,
what with modem methods of slaughtering, regular government
inspection and sanitary food preparation, is quite clearly an anachronism
which should be discarded along with the horse and carriage and the
high-button shoe.24
15. Leviticus 11:3.
16. Leviticus 11:4-8.
17. Leviticus 11:9-12. See 6 Encyclopaedia Judaica, supra note 13, at 37-38 (Dietary Laws).
18. Leviticus 11:13-19.
19. Leviticus 11:29-31.
20. Leviticus 11:32-38.
21. Deuteronomy 12:15-17, 23. This same prohibition is also found in Genesis 9:3-4 and
Leviticus 17:10-11.
22. Deuteronomy 12:27.
23. Masoudi, supra note 13, at 669.
24. Samuel H. Dresner, The Jewish Dietary Laws: Their Meaning for Our Time 12 (1982).
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Dresner suggests that the main purpose behind these laws is not health but
holiness. Through the Torah, Judaism teaches its followers to know God and to
serve God in all ways. All deeds should be made holy, both the extraordinary
and the ordinary, "[a]nd what is more common, more ordinary, more seemingly
trivial and inconsequential that the process of eating?"'  Therefore, the kosher
laws, through their restrictions and rules of cleanliness, make the act of eating
a holy act, allowing the follower of kashrut to "know" God in his or her day to
day activity. Other than perhaps daily prayer, the observance of kashrut provides
Jews with a more continuous and structured way in which to worship God than
any other practice in the religion.
Another purpose for kashrut lies in the spirituality of the body itself. Bleich
suggests the food one consumes has "a profound effect upon his spiritual well-
being."'  By regulating what enters one's body, one concentrates not only on
how food affects the body physically, but also how it affects the soul. "For a
Jew the body is not simply a vessel serving as a container of a sacred soul, but
is itself an instrument of spirituality."27 In Judaism, then, there is no strict
dichotomy between the body and the soul. The two must exist as equal pillars
of health, and the kosher laws maintain this balance by directing that only holy
food be consumed by both the body and the spirit of the observer.
2. Standards, Burdens, and Results
Three federal cases prior to Turner deal specifically with the conflict
between a prisoner's Free Exercise right to practice kashrut and prison
regulations: United States v. Huss,2" Kahane v. Carlson,29 and Prushinowsld
v. Hambrick.3" These cases have established a series of standards to determine
whether a valid Free Exercise claim has been established and who carries the
burden of proof therein. The analysis will show that the courts have favored the
prisoners' arguments.
a. United States v. Huss
United States v. Huss involved an Orthodox Jew detained at West Street
Detention Center in New York.3 Defendant Smilow was to be transferred to
another facility in Kentucky. He applied for an order to be given kosher food
products during his internment in New York. Smilow explained that although
25. Id. at 18.
26. 3 J. David Bleich, Contemporary Halakhic Problems 59 (1989).
27. Id. at 59.
28. 394 F. Supp. 752 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
29. 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975).
30. 570 F. Supp. 863 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
31. Actually the case involves two prisoners, Huss and Smilow, but Huss was found not to be
a bona fide observer of the kosher laws. Huss, 394 F. Supp. at 754.
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he was able to eat certain foods, such as fresh fruits, vegetables, and some dry
and canned goods, he could not eat any cooked food for fear that the cooking
utensils had touched unclean meats.32 He demanded frozen kosher meals which
were available from the local Board of Rabbis. The prison argued it should not
be compelled to provide frozen kosher meals to any of the prisoners because
there would be extreme difficulty in always using separate utensils and the price
of the kosher frozen meals was two to three times more than the non-kosher
frozen meals.33 The prison also argued this type of preferential treatment could
potentially cause unrest with the other inmates.'
The court began its analysis by noting that although "[t]here appear[ed] to
be no reported judicial decision dealing with a request by an Orthodox Jew to
be provided with Kosher food in prison,"" there were cases involving impris-
oned Black Muslims and their dietary problems. 6 Those cases utilized a
"compelling government interest" standard under which the prison authorities had
the burden of proving a compelling interest in restricting the prisoners' Free
Exercise rights. The court, however, ignored those decisions and opted for the
more prison-friendly standard enunciated in Pell v. Procunier.7 Pell held that
the courts should defer to prisons attempting to achieve "legitimate penological
objectives" and that prisoners retain only those rights not inconsistent with these
objectives.38
The Huss court agreed that a prisoner's First Amendment rights are
"severely curtailed" when in confinement, and explained
in order for a prisoner to successfully challenge prison procedures on
First Amendment grounds, he has the burden of showing that the
procedure or practice in question is clearly unreasonable; and in this
inquiry the expert judgment of the prison officials is accorded substan-
tial deference. 9
32. Id. at 759.
33. Id. at 757.
34. Apparently, the unrest was already happening. Six "militant Black Muslim" inmates
cornered the prison food administer in a "threatening manner," requiring that they, too, be provided
with a diet that satisfied their religious practices. Id. at 758.
35. Id. at 760.
36. Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (1969); Russ v. Blackledge, 477 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1973);
Walter v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cit. 1969); Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. Okla.
1974).
37. 417 U.S. 817, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974). California inmates brought an action challenging a
California Department of Corrections regulation that forbade media interviews with individual
inmates. The prisoners argued the regulation unconstitutionally burdened their First Amendment right
of free speech. The Supreme Court held there was no violation of the constitutional right of free
speech because the prisoners were allowed "alternative means of communication." Id. at 818, 94 S.
Ct. at 2802.
38. Huss, 394 F. Supp. at 760, restating Pell, 417 U.S. at 822, 826-27, 94 S. CL at 2804, 2806.
39. Huss, 394 F. Supp. at 762 (emphasis added).
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Applying this standard, the court determined the "defendants in the present action
have failed to show that they are constitutionally entitled to be supplied with
Kosher food during their imprisonment."'4 The court reasoned the prison's
reasons for denying Smilow's requests, namely high prices and potential prisoner
unrest, were sufficient to deny Smilow's requests.
The court here may have been somewhat quick to support the prison
system's judgment. In a supplemental opinion,4 the court addressed a
memorandum filed by the State of New York after the Huss decision, requesting
a more inmate-friendly standard of proof. The state, in the memorandum, cited
Procunier v. Martinez,42 which held that after a prisoner has "shown" that a
prison policy has infringed on his Free Exercise rights, the burden is on the
prison authorities to show
the policy or regulation furthers a substantial governmental interest
connected with the legitimate goals of the correction system, unrelated
to the suppression of religion, and must further show that the limitation
on religious exercise is not greater than is necessary or essential to the
protection of the particular government interest involved.43
The court, however, disagreed. Explaining that Martinez dealt with censorship
of prison mail, an issue also dealing with the rights of non-prisoners, the Huss
court found the Pell decision, regarding press interviews with inmates, to be
closer on point. Thereafter, the court simply reiterated its prior position, granting
deference to the prison system. In the near future, however, the Martinez
standard would arise again.
b. Kahane v. Carlson
Meir Kahane, an Orthodox Rabbi imprisoned in New York, filed an order
with the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
demanding kosher meals. The court in this case took a different approach to
Kahane's request than did the court in Huss. The court proclaimed "[t]he dietary
laws are an important, integral part of the covenant between the Jewish people
and the God of Israel." The court focused on the issue that a small number
of Orthodox Jews are imprisoned. Considering that this preferential treatment
40. Id. at 762.
41. Id. at 762. Huss was decided on May 5, 1975. The supplemental opinion was issued on
May 14, 1975.
42. 416 U.S. 396,94 S. Ct. 1800 (1974). California inmates brought a class action challenging
California Department of Corrections regulations that 1) censored prison mail and 2) banned prisoner
access to law students and paralegals for attorney-client interviews. The Supreme Court held the
regulation censoring prisoner mail violated the prisoner's right to free speech, and the regulation
banning the legal interviews unconstitutionally obstructed the prisoners' access to the courts.
43. Huss, 394 F. Supp. at 763.
44. Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975).
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might cause unrest among the other prisoners, the court found the difficulties of
providing kosher food for these few inmates were "surmountable" by prison
authorities.
The court began its legal analysis with Martinez, the case that the Huss court
declined to consider. The court stated restrictions on prisoners are "not without
limit,"4 6 and continued by re-erecting the Martinez standard which had been
dismissed by the Huss court:
Where [the prison restrictions] operate on fundamental rights such as
the freedom of worship, the degree of restriction must be only that
which can justified by an "important or substantial government interest"
in the restriction by the penal institution.'7
Interestingly, although the court moved towards a more prisoner-friendly
standard, it refused to decide whether restrictions on prisoners' First Amendment
rights in general must be justified by the "compelling government interest,"
found in Goodwin v. Oswald,'8 or by the less stringent "important or substantial
interest" standard enunciated in Martinez. The court, however, reached the
conclusion that even under the standard most favorable to the government, the
denial of kosher food was not justified.49 The court found there were reason-
able means of providing Kahane with a kosher diet and made several sugges-
tions, such as providing frozen kosher dinners. Evoking the Pell reasoning, the
court warned "each and every" method need not be followed, for "[p]rison
authorities have reasonable discretion in selecting the means by which prisoners'
rights are effectuated."5 The court held a diet sufficient to keep Kahane in
good health without compromising kashrut should be provided.
c. Prushinowski v. Hambrick
Inmate Prushinowski sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. Section
2241, alleging that he suffered health problems due to a poor diet resulting from
the prison not providing kosher food. Prushinowski asked (1) that the kitchen
be made kosher and that he be provided special kosher food, (2) that he be given
his own cooking materials to prepare his own kosher meals, or (3) that he be
transferred to another prison that could satisfy his kosher requests."
The court first considered the Pell "not inconsistent with legitimate
penological objectives" standard and the Cruz "paramount state interest"
45. Id. at 495.
46. Id. at 495.
47. Id. at 495 (quoting Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 94 S. Ct. at 1811).
48. 462 F.2d 1237, 1244 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Kahane, 527 F.2d at 495 n.6.
50. Id. at 496.
51. Prushinowski v. Hambrick, 570 F. Supp. 863, 864-65 (E.D.N.C. 1983).
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standard. 2 Then the court proposed a third alternative standard requiring that
the restriction be "'reasonably and substantially justified by considerations of
prison discipline and order' and must be the least restrictive alternative
available."53 Out of this legal morass, the court decided simply to "balanc[e]
... Prushinowski's First Amendment freedoms and [the need for] prison
discipline and security." 4
The court cited Kahane and its progeny and declared that prison authorities
must accommodate prisoners' religious dietary requests. Prison officials must
show the food provided to the prisoners in their custody is adequate for both the
prisoners' health and religious beliefs. As for the prison's argument that
Prushinowski's requests for specific kosher foods were different than those
requested by other Orthodox Jewish prisoners, the court stressed that the First
Amendment protects an individual's beliefs whether or not that belief is held by the
majority of similar observers. 5  The prison's second argument, that the special
food allowed in the prison may contain contraband, was also rebuffed by the court,
for lack of supporting evidence. The court, however, denied Prushinowski's
request that prison officials not touch kosher food entering the prison (thereby
making the food unclean) because the prison's need to inspect the food for
contraband was paramount. As in Huss, the prison officials argued kosher food
was too expensive to provide. Unlike Huss, however, the court in Prushinowski
allowed outside kosher foodstuffs to be donated to the prisoner, thus offsetting
potential economic problems.5 6
d. The Trend
These cases show the law favoring prisoners in issues regarding the Free
Exercise protection of rights involving the kosher laws. The burden of proving
religious curtailment was shifted from the prisoner in Huss to the prison officials
in Kahane and Prushinowski. The standard for determining whether a prisoner's
religious liberties are being impaired by prison regulations has never reached the
strict "compelling interest" standard used in other prisoner cases. The "important
and substantial government interest" test in Kahane and the balancing test used in
Prushinowksi, however, represent a quantum leap in favor of the prisoner from the
"clearly unreasonable" test enunciated inHuss. It appeared as long as their requests
were fairly reasonable, Jewish prisoners would be provided a kosher diet.
52. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S. Ct. 1079 (1972).
53. Prushinowski, 570 F. Supp. at 866 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 866.
55. The court was quoting Moskowitz v. Wilson, 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977), to be
discussed at length infra.
56. See United States v. Huss, 394 F. Supp. 752, 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("I am also persuaded
that it would be contrary to good order and discipline to permit one group of prisoners, or
organizations supporting them, to pay for their more expensive, special food. In addition, the security
problems referred to by the Bureau of Prisons cannot be overlooked."). Id.
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B. Prohibition of the Cutting of Facial Hair
1. Biblical Origins
Two sections of the Torah discuss prohibitions against the cutting of facial
hair. In the Book of Leviticus, God tells Moses to speak to the ancient Hebrews
regarding a myriad of laws, and in Chapter 19 verse 27, Moses states "Ye shall
not round the comers of your heads, neither shalt thou mar the comers of thy
beard." The purpose or meaning behind this command is not clear. One
possible reason for the shaving prohibition was to differentiate ancient Hebrews
from other peoples.57 Some commentators have noted that the shaving of the
head was a mourning practice of non-Hebrews in ancient times and that God was
telling Moses to discard these pagan ways."2 A similar prohibition is found in
Leviticus 21:5, where God commands Moses to warn the sons of Aaron, or the
ancient Hebrew priests, about following the ancient pagan rituals. 9 In fact, an
ancient form of humiliation involved shaving only half a beard.'
Today, the prohibition against "rounding the comers" of the head, or shaving
of one's beard, is taken very seriously by Orthodox Jews. There exist, however,
some problems in perfecting this practice:
The Torah prohibited shaving the "comers" of beard with a razor. The
beard has five "comers." However, since there are differing opinions
as to where they are, a pious person should not shave any part of the
head with a razor, even the upper lip or under the chin.6"
Thus, Orthodox Jews do not shave any part of the beard, at any time, for any
reason. Some Orthodox Jews even grow side curls, or peut, in an attempt to
strictly carry out these laws.62 Similar to kashrut, the observance of this ritual
is viewed as a way of hallowing God on a daily basis.
2. Standards, Burdens, and Results
Two federal cases focus on the conflict between a prisoner's Free
Exercise right to keep his beard untrimmed and prison regulations requiring that
beards be shaven, or trimmed: Moskowitz v. Wilkinson,63 and Fromer v.
57. 2 Encyclopaedia Judaica, supra note 13, at 356 (Beard and Shaving).
58. The Torah: A Modem Commentary 898 (W. Gunther Plaut ed., 1981).
59. "They shall not make baldness upon their head, neither shall they shave off the comers of
their beard, nor make any cuttings in their flesh." See other references to baldness and mourning
practices in Deuteronomy 14:1, Isaiah 22:12, Jeremiah 16:6, Amos 8:10, and Micah 1:16.
60. U Samuel 10:4. See also 2 Encyclopaedia Judaica, supra note 13, at 357.
61. Rabbi Gersion Appel, 1 The Concise Code of Jewish Law, complied from Kitzur Shulhan
Aruch and Traditional Sources 286-87 (1977).
62. Plaut, supra note 58, at 898.
63. 432 F. Supp. 947 (D. Conn. 1977).
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Scully.' This discussion concentrates on the same issues analyzed in the
kosher cases: the standards set by each court to determine if a valid Free
Exercise claim has been made, and who carries the burden of proof to bring or
refute that claim. Again, the cases here will show a trend towards deference to
the prisoner.
a. Moskowitz v. Wilson
Philip Moskowitz was an Orthodox Jewish prisoner at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Danbury, Connecticut. While incarcerated, Moskowitz sought a writ
of habeas corpus and motion requesting a temporary restraining order, to keep from
having to shave off his beard, in accordance with Bureau of Prison policy.'
The court first declared that "prisoners do not lose their right to practice
their religion when the prison gate closes behind them." The court noted the
Martinez "important or substantial government interest" test has been applied in
several federal courts, including the Kahane case. The court noted as well that
this standard places the burden of proof on the prison authorities. The court then
enunciated its own standard:
These cases indicate that consideration must be given to both the First
Amendment interest at issue, and the government interest asserted, and
that a judgment must be made as to whether the governmental interest
justifies impairment of the First Amendment interest. Justification in
this context must mean more than rationally related to advancing a
legitimate objective. 67
The court ignored standards used by the courts prior to Martinez which were less
favorable to the prisoner. The court further explained that the restriction must
be "generally necessary" to protect a legitimate government interest" and that
a mere "reasonable relation" will not suffice.
The government argued Moskowitz's belief should not be protected because
most other Jews do not observe this practice. The court found this claim lacked
merit, stating that the belief in question is Moskowitz's, not anyone else's. It is
irrelevant, the court explained, what other Jews do or do not practice.
The purported governmental interest was examined next. The prison
authorities claimed the no-beard rule was necessary for "effective identification
64. 817 F.2d 227 (2d Cit. 1987).
65. Policy Statement 7300.64B (March 19, 1976): "There will be no limitations on hair style
and length of hair but beards will be prohibited.... Mustaches, defined as hair growing on the
upper lip, are permitted. Beards are not permitted, since they most readily compromise security
because of the consequent rapid modification of appearance." Moskowitz, 432 F. Supp. at 948 n.1
(emphasis added).
66. Id. at 948 (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S. Ct. 1079 (1972)).
67. Id. at 949.
68. Id. at 949.
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of inmates to ensure prison security and to facilitate apprehension of inmate
escapees. 69 The government provided evidence showing that beards can easily
change the appearance of inmates because they can be formed and shaped in a
myriad of styles, making effective identification of inmates difficult. The court,
however, found other evidence more compelling. For example, a survey
conducted by the National Institute of Corrections indicated fifty percent of the
state prison systems polled had no beard restrictions at all. Furthermore, the
court pointed to the fact that the prison in question had no restrictions concerning
hair style or length, raising further questions as to whether beards posed such a
serious problem to prison identifications. The court concluded the problems with
identification "are not shown to pose a sufficiently serious risk as to outweigh
the inmate's religious interest in wearing a beard."70
b. Fromer v. Scully (II)"'
Yevgen Fromer, an Orthodox Jew, was being detained at the New York
Department of Corrections when he filed an action under 23 U.S.C. Section 1983
against the prison. Fromer had been punished several times' for not submitting
to a "Department Directive,"" requiring that all beards be trimmed to a length
of no more than one inch.
The court began with a discussion of the Reynolds v. United States4
distinction between First Amendment protection of an individual's beliefs and his
practices.75 The court resolved this issue by stating that according to recent
Supreme Court rulings the degree of curtailment of religious practice depends on
the relationship between that individual and the governmental entity imposing the
69. Id. at 950.
70. Id. at 951.
71. This discussion of Fromer centers around its second incarnation, following Fromer v.
Scully, 649 F. Supp. 512 (S.D.N.Y.1986) ("Fromer 7)'). Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69 (2d Cir.
1989) ("Fromer (aJ)'), will be discussed in Section IV infra.
72. Fromer was disciplined twice for failing to trim his beard while at the Great Meadow
Correctional Facility, and was placed in solitary confinement for 30 days for again refusing to trim
his beard upon transfer to the Wallkill Correctional Facility. Fromer v. Scully, 817 F.2d 227, 228,
229 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Fromer (I)").
73. Id. at 228.
74. 98 U.S. 145 (1878). In Reynolds, a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints in Utah was prosecuted for the crime of bigamy, a practice accepted by the Church. The
defendant argued that this practice was protected by the Free Exercise Clause, but the Supreme Court
disagreed, holding that while the law could not control religious beliefs, it could curtail religious acts
deemed criminal by society.
75. The court noted "[a]lthough the free exercise clause by its terms appears to impose an
absolute proscription on the power of the government, only an individual's belief is beyond
governmental intrusion. The right to engage in a practice concomitant with religious belief always
has been balanced against the state's interest in applying neutral rules of conduct evenhandedly to
all citizens." Fromer (), 817 F.2d at 229.
1996]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
restriction. 6 The court discussed the question of prison restrictions and settled
on a standard enunciated within its own walls only two years earlier in Wali v.
Coughlin." This standard to determine whether the prisoner's Free Exercise
rights were being violated applies
where "the activity in which the prisoners seek to engage is not
presumptively dangerous, and where official action (or inaction) works
to deprive rather than merely limit the means of exercising a protected
right." . . . "In these limited circumstances, it is incumbent upon prison
officials to show that a particular restriction is necessary to further an
important governmental interest, and that the limitations on freedoms
occasioned by the restriction are no greater than necessary to effectuate
the governmental objective involved."78
The court found none of the prison's arguments compelling. First, the
prison argued the Wall decision was not factually similar to the instant case and,
thus, should be distinguished. The court, however, believed the Wall standard
was meant to evaluate inmates' constitutional claims of "any nature." Second,
the prison argued the Goldman v. Weinburger so case should be analogized to
the present one. Though the court noted that deference was given to the
government regulation in Goldman, it did not read Goldman to extend beyond
the realm of the military.8
Next, the prison asserted the court was using the wrong Wall standard to
determine whether the plaintiff's rights had been infringed.' The court,
76. The court specifically concentrated on Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission, 480
U.S. 136, 107 S. Ct. 1046 (1987). In Hobble a discharged Florida worker who refused to work on
Friday evenings and Saturday mornings was denied unemployment compensation for alleged
misconduct connected with her firing. The Supreme Court held the refusal to award unemployment
compensation violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
77. 754 F.2d I015 (2d Cir. 1985). Wall involved an injunction brought by twenty-four inmates
of various correctional facilities in New York state to enjoin the commissioner of the Department of
Correctional Services from preventing copies of a legal services report dealing with problems between
inmates and prison officials in the Attica prison from being circulated in New York prisons. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant
the injunction, finding that the prison officials failed to carry their burden of demonstrating that the
refusal to allow distribution of the report was necessary to further important penological interests.
Wall actually contained three standards by which to determine whether a prisoner's Free Exercise
rights are being violated, but the court in Fromer (71 chose standard three.
78. Fromer (11), 817 F.2d at 230 (quoting Wall, 754 F.2d at 1033).
79. Id. at 231.
80. Goldman v. Weinburger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986), involved an Orthodox
Jewish U.S. Air Force pilot who was restricted from wearing a yarmulke while on duty. The
Supreme Court held that great deference should be given the military in making restrictions, and
Goldman's claim was denied.
81. Fromer (II), 817 F.2d at 231.
82. See supra note 77. The other two Wall standards applied (I) "where the right asserted by
the prisoner 'is found not to exist within the prison context, i.e., where it is held to be inherently
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however, relied on the Moskowitz decision and the prison survey therein in
support of the argument that a beard greater than one inch in length is not
"presumptively dangerous," thus conforming with the standard the court chose.
Continuing, the court found that requiring Fromer to cut his beard would not
simply be a slight change in his religious practice, but rather would "work a total
deprivation of his religious belief that the beard must not be disturbed."'
The prison next defended the regulation by alleging several "compelling
interests." The prison argued the regulation not only assisted in identification,
but also protected against hidden contraband and promoted safety and hygiene.
The court below disagreed, finding that contraband could just as easily be hidden
on other parts of an inmate's body and that current inspection methods would
succeed in finding contraband in a prisoner's beard." As far as hygiene risks,
the district court could not see a difference between a risk presented by long hair
and a risk presented by long beards."S The Second Circuit agreed with this
analysis, and confirmed that the beard length restriction was unconstitutional.
c. The Trend
As with the cases regarding the kosher claims, the cases dealing with the
cutting of facial hair favor the prisoner. The question of deference to the prison
authorities was barely mentioned; the burden of proof was placed on the prisons,
and the standard applied in both cases required an "important or substantial
governmental interest" in order to curtail the Free Exercise right of the prisoner.
However, the deference towards the prisoner and the strictness of the standard
were not to last very long.
III. THE TURNER STANDARD AND ITS EFFECT
A. Turner v. Safley and its Progeny
1. Turner v. Safley
Turner v. Safley 6 was decided by the United States Supreme Court on June
1, 1987, only one month and six days after the Fromer decision was handed
down. Turner reversed the law that governed prisoners for over a decade, and
inconsistent with established penological objectives,"' or (2) "if the asserted protected activity is
'presumptively dangerous' or if the challenged restriction 'proscribe(s] only one of numerous
available means of enjoying protected liberties,'.. ." Fromer (A1), 817 F.2d at 230 (quoting Wali,
754 F.2d at 1033).
83. Fromer (II), 817 F.2d at 232.
84. Fromer (), 649 F. Supp. 512, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
85. Id. at 521.
86. 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
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began a new trend in the jurisprudence that would adversely affect Orthodox
Jewish prisoners.
Ironically, Turner did not even involve religion. A class action suit filed by
prisoners alleged that two Missouri prison regulations were unconstitutional. The
first regulation prohibited, with some exceptions, correspondence between
inmates at different state prisons.8 7 The second regulation contained an almost
complete ban on inmate marriages.8 The class action requested injunctive
relief from these two prohibitions.
The Court's analysis, written by Justice O'Connor, thoroughly discussed the
evolution of constitutional claims dealing with prison regulations. Justice
O'Connor began with Pell,"9 noting that that case stood for the proposition that
prisoners do not leave their constitutional rights at the prison gates." The
Court gave three examples of such rights: opportunity to petition the government
for redress, protection against racial discrimination, and the protections afforded
by due process." Justice O'Connor, however, stated that Pell also stood for a
second principle: the courts are not the best administrators when it comes to
determining the reasoning behind prison regulations. Justice O'Connor noted that
Pell involved the rights of both prisoners and nonprisoners and that the standard
established therein was not solely for the protection of prisoner's constitutional
rights. However, she believed that in the jurisprudence that followed Pell,' the
Supreme Court had settled the question of how these competing interests are to
be adjudged on a case-by-case basis:
If Pell, Jones, and Bell have not already resolved the posed in Martinez,
we resolve it now: when a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.93
The Court explained that a "strict scrutiny" standard would drastically restrain
the prison from making certain decisions. Furthermore, a "strict scrutiny"
standard would generate increased litigation against the prison system, further
hampering its processes.
Justice O'Connor then enunciated a four-factor test to determine the
reasonableness of a contested regulation:
First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify
87. Id. at 81, 107 S. Ct. at 2258.
88. Id. at 82, 107 S. Ct. at 2258.
89. Pell v. Procunier, 47 U.S. 817, 94 S. Ct. 2800 (1974).
90. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84, 107 S. Ct. at 2259.
91. Id. at 84, 107 S. Ct. at 2259.
92. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoner's Union, 433 U.S. 119, 97 S. Ct. 2532 (1977); and
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
93. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S. Ct. at 2261 (emphasis added).
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it.... A second factor... is whether there are alternative means of
exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates.... A third
consideration is the impact accomodation of the asserted constitutional
right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of
prison resources generally.... Finally, the absence of ready alterna-
tives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation."
Justice O'Connor qualified the fourth factor, stating that the courts need not "set up
and then shoot down"' every possible accomodation, but that a prisoner should
be able to provide evidence of unreasonableness by pointing to an alternative which
imposes only a de minimis cost to the legal penological objective.
Under these factors, a five-to-four majority found that although the prohibition
of inter-prison correspondence reasonably relates to a valid penological objective,
the marriage restriction does not."
2. O'Lone v. Shabazz
Decided on the same day as Turner, O'Lone v. Estate ofShabazz' applied the
factors enunciated in Turner to questions arising specifically under the Free
Exercise Clause. O'Lone involved Muslim prisoners imprisoned at the New Jersey
State Prison. Problems arose when the state adopted a regulation that placed certain
minimum-security workers on detail outside the main prison building, only
allowing them inside the building for specified reasons. This regulation prevented
Muslim prisoners from attending Jumu'ah, a religious service held in the main
prison building. Two prisoners sued the prison under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for
damages and injunctive relief.
The Court found the regulation was reasonably related to a valid penological
interest, maintaining security.9" The Court determined that allowing this type of
prison traffic to move within and without the complex would make keeping track
of the prisoners more difficult. Furthermore, this type of "special treatment" was
sure to create dissent among the ranks of the inmates. The Court also determined
that when considering legitimate penological interests, the burden should not be
placed on the prison officials to show the reasonableness of the regulation."
94. Id. at 89, 90, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 90-91, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
96. The opinion of Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, questioned the
constitutionality of the "logical connection" standard. This opinion will be examined in more detail
in Part III.
97. 482 U.S. 342, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987).
98. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, White and Powell voted in favor
of the defendant prison; Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmnn, and Stevens voted in favor of the
plaintiff inmates.
99. In his dissent, Justice Brennan voiced concern, like Justice Stevens in Turner, regarding the
constitutionality of the "reasonableness" test. Justice Brennan's dissent will be examined in greater
detail in Part III of this Comment.
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Thus, in these two companion cases, the law governing the Free Exercise
claims of prisoners moved from favorable to the inmate to deferential to the
jailor. The "compelling" and "important or substantial" governmental interest
tests supposedly established by the Court in cases such as Pell suddenly gave
way to the lenient "reasonable relation" test. The new ,four-factor test places the
burden of proof on the prisoner, whereas in earlier cases the courts required the
prison to explain why its regulation was constitutional.
B. Turner and the Effect on Kosher Cases
1. Cooper v. Rogers
The first test of the new Turner standard as applied to problems with
Orthodox Jewish prisoners and kashrut came in the form of Cooper v.
Rogers) °° Cooper involved an inmate, Richard Cooper, who brought a Section
1983 action, claiming that the Maryland Penitentiary failed to provide him with
a kosher breakfast in violation of his Free Exercise rights. A kosher lunch and
dinner were provided by the prison, but the prison officials had refused to
comply with a request by a local rabbi to also provide a kosher breakfast."0 '
Cooper brought this action challenging the constitutionality of the prison
official's refusal.
The court began its discussion with Turner and O'Lone, noting that lower
courts have applied the lenient "legitimate penological interest" standard to cases
concerning prisoner's diets. The court summarily concluded Cooper did not have
a right to a specially prepared breakfast. Discussing Cooper's contention that
Kahane and Prushinowski established the precedential standard in this case, the
court stated a lesser, pre-Turner standard had been employed by the courts in
those cases, and concluded that ". . . despite their factual relevance to this case,
Kahane and Prushinowski can place no greater obligation on defendants than do
Turner and O'Lone.' 0
2
Despite expert testimony on behalf of Cooper, the court concluded Cooper
had not satisfied his burden of proving why the food in the breakfast line was
not sufficiently kosher. The court's analysis here indicates how switching
standards from a "compelling state interest" to a "legitimate penological interest"
made it difficult for Cooper to make out a case, even with expert witnesses. The
court continued, noting that the availability of kosher food is only relevant in
determining whether there are reasonable alternatives open to exercise religious
rights, the second factor of the Turner test. 3 Furthermore, the court noted it
100. 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991).
101. Rabbi Meyer Kurcfeld, the kosher food inspector for Baltimore County. Id. at 256.
102. Id. at 258 n.8.
103. The second factor of the Turner test is "whether there are alternative means of exercising
the right that remain open to prison inmates." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S. Ct. 2254,
2262 (1987).
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was reasonable for Cooper to buy his own kosher food at the commissary, for
neither Turner nor O'Lone stated "such an alternative must be state-subsi-
dized."'u °
The court concluded its analysis (ignoring the other Turner factors) by
examining the price of the kosher breakfast because "[i]n the final analysis, the
question comes down to one of cost.""0 5 The court found each kosher break-
fast cost between $2.50 and $5.00, much more than the $.50 average cost of a
non-kosher breakfast. Thus, the court concluded the costs could not be
considered de minimis, "particularly in light of the impact which providing
Cooper with special treatment might have upon the state's duty to provide similar
treatment for inmates of other religions."'06 Hence, in the end, the court based
its holding on the unreasonable cost of providing the plaintiff with a kosher
breakfast as opposed to utilizing the tests set up by the Supreme Court in Turner.
2. Bass v. Coughlin'07
Similar to Kahane, Bass involved a Jewish prisoner who requested kosher
meals. Bass brought a Section 1983 action against New York state prison
officials. The prison officials claimed the law regarding this subject was now
"beclouded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions,"'18 alluding to Turner and
O'Lone.
Rejecting this notion, the United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized religiously-demanded prison diets had been protected since Kahane
in 1975. The court then asserted "Kahane has never been overruled and remains
the law."'" The court explained that because Turner and O'Lone dealt with
different issues such as marriage and attendance of religious ceremonies, the
holding in Kahane "was not placed in any reasonable doubt.""'  Thus, the
court did not even attempt to employ the Turner standard. As a result, the
inmate's claim was successful.
3. Ward v. Walsh"
Ward involved the same problem found in Bass, but unlike the Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit turned to Turner. Ward, a Jewish prisoner, complained
104. Cooper, 788 F. Supp. at 259. This court, unlike the court in Prnshinowski, did not discuss
the option of food being brought in to Cooper.
105. Id. at 260.
106. Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
107. 976 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1992).
108. Id. at 99.
109. Id. at 99.
110. Id. at99.
111. 1 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 1993).
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several of his rights were being denied by the court,"' and brought suit under
Section 1983. Ward was the only Orthodox Jewish prisoner at Ely State Prison.
The prison warden argued Employment Division v. Smith"3 was controlling.
The court, however, chose to distinguish Smith and follow Turner instead.
Turning to the first Turner factor-"whether there is a logical connection
between the policy and the legitimate governmental interest that justifies
it""'4 -the court found that the prison's interest in operating a simplified food
line to lessen administrative burdens is a legitimate interest sufficient to justify
the prohibition on special diets. As for the second Turner factor-"whether
Ward has alternative means by which he can practice his religion"" 5-the
court, following O'Lone, stated the factor doesn't consider whether alternative
means of practicing are available, but rather whether the prisoner has been
"denied all means of religious expression."" 6 Comparing the instant case to
0 'Lone, the court found Ward, in fact, had been denied practically all means of
religious expression. As the only Orthodox Jew in the facility, he had no access
to an Orthodox rabbi or to religious services. Thus, the court found the second
Turner factor operated in the defendant's favor.
Importantly, the court underscored the distinction between being denied a
religious practice which is an expression of one's faith, and being denied a
practice "which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul."".. The court
stated this distinction must be considered when determining whether there exists
an alternative means of religious expression. Because no factual findings were
made by the district court on this issue, the Court of Appeals remanded the case.
The court also remanded the case on the basis of lack of findings for the
third and fourth Turner factors. The court stated the administrative costs of
providing the food, not to mention the cost of the meals themselves, were
dispositive in determining the third Turner factor-the "'impact accomodation
... will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally.""" The court found the fourth Turner factor, regarding
ready alternatives available to the prisoner at de minimis cost to the prison, was
also insufficiently addressed.
112. Ward was also denied having candles in his cell, clothes of one fiber, and access to an
Orthodox rabbi. Id. at 876.
113. 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990). Smith involved two individuals who were denied
unemployment compensation after being fired for ingesting peyote. The Supreme Court found for
the state, determining that the Free Exercise Clause does not allow exemptions from a law that is
neutral and of general applicability.
114. Ward, I F.3d at 877.
115. Id. at 877.
116. Id. at 877.
117. Id. at 878 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 878 (quoting Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1038
(1990)).
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C. Turner and the Effect on the Beard Restrictions
1. Ross v. Coughlin" 9
Ross was the first post-Turner case dealing with Free Exercise claims brought
by Orthodox Jewish prisoners. Ross challenged a regulation of New York State's
Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) that stated"' [a]ll inmates may grow
a beard and/or mustache not to exceed one (1) inch in length.""'  Turning to the
Turner factors, the court stated "'a regulation must have a logical connection to
legitimate government interests invoked to justify it."".' With respect to the first
Turner factor, the state argued that limiting beard length to identify prisoners and
control contraband was a logical connection to a legitimate government interest.
This court, however, like the court in Fromer (I), found these claims were without
merit. In Fromer (I), the court disagreed with prison officials who claimed a beard
longer than one inch created identification problems. The court pointed out that
other ways of changing appearances, such as growing different hairstyles, were not
regulated by the prison system. Therefore, there existed no logical relation between
the beard length restriction and efficient identification. Furthermore, the Fromer
(I) court found no evidence supporting the allegation that contraband may be
hidden in a longer beard. The Ross court adopted these findings, and found the first
factor in favor of Ross.
2 2
The second Turner factor-what "'alternative means of exercising the right...
remain open to prison inmates'"'-was a simple question for this court:
[t]here are of course no alternative means by which Ross can exercise his
First Amendment right. If the State requires him to cut his facial hair it
will work a total deprivation of his religious belief that the beard must not
be disturbed. 2
4
Rejecting the state's argument that O'Lone is factually similar to the instant case
and thus should be followed, the court continued with the third Turner factor-the
impact of the accommodation on the other prisoners as well as administrative
procedure. Again, this court deferred to Fromer (H), finding that the limited
production of "confusion and resentment" was not enough to deny Ross his
rights. "
119. 669 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
120. DOCS directive #4914. Id. at 1239. Ross also complained that he did not receive kosher
food and that religious articles were taken away from him in violation of his religious rights. The
court's recitation of the facts revealed the blatant hostility and disrespect that Ross received once he
was incarcerated. Id. at 1237-38.
121. Id. at 1239 (paraphrasing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987)).
122. Id. at 1240.
123. Id. at 1240 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S. Ct. at 2262).
124. Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
125. Id.
1996]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Although the court favored Ross on the issue of beard trimming, it came down
in favor of the state on the issue of shaving for an initial identification photograph.
Applying the Turner factors again, the court decided that mandatory shaving for
this purpose was logically related to the legitimate penological interest of accurate
identification.1 16 Further, although admitting again that Ross had no alternative
means in this situation, the court believed the prison's security interests outweighed
Ross' belief, noting that shaving with certain instruments "lessens" the burden on
the religious practice.' The court concluded the state had shown a "reasonable
and legitimate penological objective" in curtailing the plaintiff's rights."
This case is notable for several reasons. First, the court did not even consider
the fourth factor of the Turner analysis, 29 similar to Cooper's30 "unfinished"
discussion. Second, even though the court provided some protection to the prisoner
regarding shaving, it nevertheless ultimately deferred to the prison by condoning
an initial shave for an identification picture. The court was searching for a bright-
line test, but it became more and more deferential to the state in the process,
without fully considering the impact on the inmate.
2. Fromer v. Scully (IV)
Although Fromer had been released on parole since Fromer (II), the debate still
raged on as to the constitutionality of Directive #4914 which requires all beards be
trimmed to a length of no more than one inch.' In Fromer (II), the district
court, on remand from the Supreme Court, held there existed "'no logical
connection"' between the beard limitation and the identification reasoning. In
Fromer (IV), however, the Second Circuit announced "[w]e believe that Turner and
0 'Lone call for greater deference to the judgment of prison officials than was given
by the district court."'
3 3
Discussing the first Turner factor, the court pointed out that the burden of
proving whether the regulation has a rational connection to a legitimate governmen-
tal interest does not fall on the prison (as the district court found), but on the
prisoner. 34 The court found the relationship between beard length and efficient
126. Id. at 1241.
127. Id. at 1241. The court noted this point was also made in Fromer (I), 649 F. Supp. at 514-
15. Id.
128. Id. at 1241.
129. "The absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation."
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90, 107 S. Ct. at 2262.
130. Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255 (D. Md. 1991).
131. Fromer v. Scully, 874 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Fromer (M1)"). This discussion of Fromer
centers around its fourth incarnation, on remand from the Supreme Court, 484 U.S. 90, 108 S. Ct.
254 (1987), to determine the case in light of Turner, Fromer v. Scully, 693 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) ('Fromer (III)").
132. Fromer IV, 874 F.2d at 73 (quoting Froamer (ti), 693 F. Supp. at 154041).
133. Id. at 73.
134. Id. at 74.
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identification is "logical, if not obvious.9135 The court also rejected the argument
that, if the regulation allows some beards, it should allow all beards.
Concerning the prison's contention that the beard length restriction was
necessary to prevent the concealment of contraband, the court stated that although
"DOCS' expert witness could offer no examples of contraband discovered in
inmates' beards,"'" 6 Turner allows, indeed, "obliges [this court] to ensure the
ability of prison officials 'to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative
solutions. "1
37
As for the second Turner factor, the court compared the instant case to O'Lone
and found the prison allowed Fromer to observe other religious practices. The
court concluded:
We are unable to discern any distinguishing feature that would permit us
to allow Orthodox Jews such as Fromer the unrestricted practice of their
religion notwithstanding substantial conflicting governmental concerns
when similar rights have also been validly denied to Moslems. 38
Turning to the third and fourth Turner factors the Second Circuit again
repudiated the district court's placement of the burden of proof on the prison
officials. The court explained the prisoner has the burden of showing that the
accomodation of the religious practice will not adversely impact other inmates or
prison resources. The court also dismissed the district court's finding that
rephotographing inmates could be an acceptable alternative, allowing the
accommodation of the prisoner's rights at a de minimis cost (Turner factor four).
The court considered DOCS testimony that rephotgraphing inmates would not meet
with the same concerns as the beard length restriction and that the "de minimis"
costs of rephotographing inmates also include burdensome administrative costs.
Concluding, the court found Fromer had not met his burden of showing that the
prison officials "'.,. exaggerated their response to... genuine security consider-
ations."" 3
9
3. Friedman v. Arizona
140
The Arizona Department of Corrections (ADOC) created a regulation
prohibiting full or partial beards, but permitting moustaches, sideburns, and
shoulder length hair. Friedman and another Orthodox Jewish inmate, Naftel,
filed a Section 1983 complaint seeking injunctive relief from this regulation.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 75.
137. Id. (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (emphasis added by the Second
Circuit)).
138. Id. at 75.
139. Id. at 76 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 561-62, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1885-86 (1979)).
140. 912 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1990).
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The evidence adduced in the district court showed Friedman and Naftel had
access to other means of expressing their religious beliefs, such as occasional
kosher meals and visits from a rabbi. Conflicting testimony was offered by a
rabbi who stated that while some Jews "view the beard as a matter of fundamen-
tal importance," others do not."" The prison officials testified that the no-
beard rule serves three prison objectives: rapid identification of inmates to
control day-to-day affairs, control of prison disturbances, and apprehending
escaped prisoners.
Applying the Turner factors, the court found the prison officials' reasons for
the restriction were logically related to valid penological interests. 42 The court
emphasized that the "alternative means" test (Turner factor number two) does not
require finding a replacement for the religious practice in question, but "[r]ather,
our task under the alternative means analysis is to assess only the degree to
which a regulation impinges upon a prisoner's asserted right."'43 Thus, the
court concluded the inmates have not been denied "all means of expression"
because they have access to a rabbi, as well as being provided with at least one
kosher dinner a day.'" The court failed to consider the degree of deprivation
that the shaving of the beard would have on Friedman and Naftel.
Regarding the impact that the accommodation would have on the other
inmates and prison resources, the court concluded that allowing the inmates to
grow beards would strain prison resources.' The court also refuted the
prisoners' suggestion that accurate identification would be possible if two
pictures, one with and one without the beard, were taken. According to expert
testimony, this alternative would not be satisfactory because the beard could be
cut in many forms, or even dyed, to change the appearance of the inmate.
The court here failed to realize that the whole impetus behind Friedman and
Naftel's claim was that they did not want to cut the beard at all. The Jewish
prohibition against cutting the beard is absolute, and doesn't even allow trim-
ming.'46 The court concluded, citing with approval the jurisprudence in the
Fromer saga, and found for the prison officials.
The standards set up by Turner and O'Lone gave prison officials much
greater deference in determining what inmate religious practices would be
tolerated behind the prison walls. The federal courts following these decisions
wielded these standards to the detriment of the prisoners, almost always finding
the restrictions on the religious practices constitutional.
141. 912 F.2d at 330.
142. Id. at 331.
143. Id. at 332.
144. Id.
145. Id. It is interesting to note that the court doesn't make the conclusion that if only these two
prisoners were allowed to grow beards, they would be even more recognizable, because all other
prisoners would be clean shaven.
146. See discussion in Section 1., A. infra; see also Moskowitz v. Wilkinson, 432 F. Supp. 947,
949 (D. Conn. 1977); Ross v. Coughlin, 669 F. Supp. 1235, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE TURNER STANDARD
As the above cases indicate, the plight of the Orthodox Jewish prisoner
worsened dramatically after Turner. As one scholar noted: "an unfortunate
trend [had] developed."' 47 With the heavy burden on the prisoner to show that
his rights had been greatly circumscribed, the courts were reluctant to find
constitutional violations. The new "rational relation to legitimate penological
interests" test effectively validated any prison regulation.
This section of the comment will shed some light on the problems that the
Turner standard has created. First, a lack of uniformity in application of the
Turner factors has lead to erratic and unfair results. Second, the initial Turner
factor of "rational relation to legitimate penological interests" promotes blind
deference in favor of prison officials. Finally, and most importantly, the second
factor, which considers "alternative means" of worship, actually leads to a total
deprivation of prisoners' practices of kashrut and refraining from shaving their
beards.
A. Lack of Uniformity Leads to Unfair Results
The first problem with the Turner standard lies in the structure of the test
itself. Although in Turner Justice O'Connor attempted to clear up the confusion
created by the Pell, Bell, and Jones cases, the courts have found the four factors
to be cumbersome. Unfortunately for the Orthodox Jewish prisoners, this test
has led to wide, varying reasoning by the federal courts, and negative results for
the Jewish prisoners.
Fromer (VT948 is a prime example of the courts' confusion with the
Turner factors. The Second Circuit court diligently perused the history of
prisoners' constitutional rights and then thoroughly discussed the first Turner
standard in relation to the facts before it. When the court began its discussion
of the second Turner standard regarding "alternative means" of religious practice,
however, it failed to analyze the instant case at all. The court merely cited
O'Lone and concluded:
We are unable to discern any distinguishing feature that would permit
us to allow Orthodox Jews such as Fromer the unrestricted practice of
their religion notwithstanding substantial conflicting governmental
concerns when similar rights have been validly denied to Moslems.'"
The court never considered exactly what the other "alternative means" were, but
rather held each group of rights up to one another and determined that the rights
147. Abraham Abramovsky, First Amendment Rights of Jewish Prisoners: Kosher Food,
Skullcaps, and Beards, 21 Am. J. Crim. L. 241, 252 (1994).
148. Fromer (IV, 874 F.2d 69, 74-76 (2d Cir. 1989).
149. Fromer (2'), 874 F.2d 69, 75 (2d Cir. 1989).
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remained equal in the eyes of the law. Neither did the court indicate the degree
to which the right was being deprived, leaving the Jewish prisoners with no
option at all.
Other evidence of the lack of uniformity in the application of the Turner
factors is found in Cooper50 and Ross."' In Cooper the court confronted
the "legitimate penological interest" standard, but ignored the "alternative
means," the effect the accomodation might have on the prison, and the absence
of ready alternatives prongs of the Turner test. It is unclear what the court used
as the linchpin in these decision. Instead of employing the supposedly
"established" tests enunciated by Justice O'Connor in Turner, the Cooper court
simply found the kosher breakfast was not worth the money, harkening back to
the Huss decision."' The Ross court was not quite as selective as the court in
Cooper; it merely declined to visit the fourth factor in the Turner analysis. In
Bass,' the court simply declined to apply Turner at all.
What did these various workings of the Turner test lead to? In each case
that employed the Turner standard, the Jewish prisoner plaintiff lost. Even
commentators, who generally championed the Turner standard, foreshadowed the
confusion that is evident in these decisions."5 Arguably, these prisoners were
not going to succeed in their claims regardless of the application of the factors.
On the other hand, justice could be served more fairly and efficiently by either
a return to the pre-Turner standard of "important" or "substantial" government
interest or even to a simpler version of the Turner test.
B. Deference to the Prisons and Unsubstantiated Claims
At first glance, Justice O'Connor's reasoning in Turner for granting
deference to prison officials appears sound:
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable
problems of prison administration. The rule would also distort the
decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment would be
subject to the possibility that some court somewhere would conclude
that it had a less restrictive way of solving the problem at hand. 5
In its application, however, this reasoning has proven impracticable. "Defer-
ence," coupled with the lesser burden of proof on prison officials to justify their
150. Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 259-60 (D. Md. 1991).
151. Ross v. Coughlin, 669 F. Supp. 1235, 1239-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
152. See discussion in Section I, supra.
153. Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992).
154. See Peter Keenan, Constitutional Law: The Supreme Court's Recent Battle Against Judicial
Oversight of Prison Affairs, 1989 Ann. Survey of American L. 507 (1989).
155. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987).
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regulations, has led to prison regulations being supported by nothing but
conjecture and guesswork. This is evident in the cases discussed above. The
Department of Corrections in Fromer (I9' propounded several reasons for
the beard length restriction. One reason was preventing prisoners from hiding
contraband in their long beards. The prison officials, however, never discussed
exactly how this surreptitious act was to occur. Moreover, the Department of
Corrections' expert witness had no proof that such activity ever occurred. The
Second Circuit, nonetheless, was not swayed by this lack of evidence, explaining
that because Turner empowers prison officials to anticipate problems, "[w]e
cannot, therefore, second-guess reasonable efforts at such anticipation.""" This
leads to the inevitable question: Who is second-guessing whom here?
Other examples of such "second-guessing" appeared in Cooper and
Friedman. The court in Cooper'58 concluded by finding the cost of the kosher
breakfast alone was enough to deny Cooper's constitutional claim. In doing so,
the court added the "special treatment" given to Cooper "might" have an adverse
effect by prompting other claims of "special treatment."" 9  Once again, no
evidence was offered by prison officials showing that any such result would arise
from Cooper's accomodation. Likewise, the Friedman"6 court found for the
defendant without any real evidence or support. In Friedman the Arizona
Department of Corrections expert testified in support of the no-beard policy,
identifying potential security problems that would arise in the absence of such
a restriction. However, no actual security problems were raised. Nonetheless,
the court noted: "Although Kennedy's testimony largely justifies the regulation
on the basis of anticipated security problems, we find Kennedy's testimony
sufficient."'' The court then proceeded to dismiss the case, citing the
applicable language from Turner.
Justice Stevens, dissenting in Turner, and Justice Brennan, dissenting in
O'Lone, believe some inherent unfairness is created when any reason, even
completely unsubstantiated, can support "legitimate penological interests." In his
dissent in Turner, Justice Stevens questioned the standard enunciated by the
majority regarding prisoners' rights, recognizing that "if the standard can be
satisfied by nothing more than a 'logical connection' between the regulation and
any legitimate penological concern perceived by a cautious warden ... it is
virtually meaningless.' 62  Stevens warned the warden's "imagination" could
be the catalyst for a regulation just waiting to be linked by a trial court to any
"logical connection."'' 63  Stevens noted the Court of Appeals found the
156. Fromer (239, 874 F.2d 69, 74-75 (2d Cir. 1989).
157. Fromer (39, 879 F.2d at 75.
158. Cooper v. Rogers, 788 F. Supp. 255, 260 (D. Md. 1991).
159. Id.
160. Friedman v. Arizona, 912 F.2d 328, 332-33 (9th Cir. 1990).
161. Friedman, 912 F.2d at 332.
162. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 100, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2267 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. I d. at 100-01, 107 S. Ct. at 2267-68.
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evidence offered by the prison in support of its regulations as "'.simply too
tenuous to justify denial of those constitutionally protected rights."""
Speculation was the theme of Stevens' dissent. He found the testimony,
including that of Superintendent Turner himself, did not adequately substantiate
the prison's concerns. Stevens found the prison regulation swept too broadly and
was an "exaggerated response" to merely anticipated problems.' 65
Justice Brennan articulated similar concerns in his dissent in O'Lone.
Brennan clearly sympathized with the prisoners, but noted the importance of
extending deference to prison officials in choosing how to best operate their
prisons. However, this decision to defer should not blind the Court to the fact
that "[tihe Constitution was not adopted as a means of enhancing the efficiency
with which government officials conduct their affairs, nor as a blueprint for
ensuring sufficient reliance on administrative expertise."'" Even though the
Turner test employed several factors in an attempt to ensure the rights of
prisoners were not needlessly trampled, Brennan believed that prison manipula-
tion of the Turner factors was inevitable. He said that, "[v]arious 'factors' may
be weighed differently in each situation, but the message to prison officials is
clear: merely act 'reasonably' and your actions will be upheld. If a directive
that officials act 'reasonably' were deemed sufficient to check all exercises of
power, the Constitution would hardly be necessary. 67 Brennan preferred the
Wali standard 6' under which he feared the prison had failed to demonstrate the
necessity of either the contested regulation or a less extreme alternative.
Furthermore, Brennan declared that even under the majority's standard, "[he]
could not conclude on this record that prison officials have proved that it is
reasonable to preclude respondents from attending Jumu'ah.'"
Justice Stevens and Justice Brennan agreed that the standard created by the
Supreme Court in Turner could potentially lead to unsubstantiated claims. The
courts in Fromer (IV), Cooper, and Friedman in fact supported prison regulations
on arguably unsubstantiated claims. 70 None of the defendants in these cases
showed with any force that regulations denying kosher meals and forcing
prisoners to shave their beards had a reasonable relation to a legitimate
penological interest. The Turner test allowed prison officials to curtail prisoners'
rights on a whim.
164. Id. at 104, 107 S. Ct. at 2269 (quoting 777 F.2d 1307, 1315-1316 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphass
added by Justice Stevens)).
165. Id. at 105, 107 S. Ct. at 2270.
166. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 356, 107 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 356, 107 S. Ct. at 2408.
168. See supra discussion in Section I.
169. 428 U.S. at 359, 107 S. Ct. at 2410 (emphasis added).
170. See supra discussion in Section III.
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C. "'Alternative means" Actually Leads to Total Deprivation
The "alternative means" factor in the Turner test has had the greatest impact
on Orthodox Jewish prisoners. Regarding the consideration of "whether there are
alternative means of exercising the rights that remain open to prison in-
mates,'. the Supreme Court in Turner referred to a singular "right," rather
than prisoners' rights generally. Justice O'Connor reiterated this point, finding
that greater deference should be given to the prison officials when there exist
'other avenues' . . . available for the exercise of the asserted right.'1
In OLone, however, the Court did not see the second Turner factor as
looking for alternatives to a particular right, but "whether under these regulations
respondents retain the ability to participate in other ... religious ceremo-
nies."' 7 3 In OLone, the Court moved from concentrating on the asserted right
to focusing on whether the prisoner had other means of religious expression.
Justice O'Connor stated that in Turner, the critical question was whether the
inmates were denied "all means of expression."'74 The Court found in OLone
there are no alternatives for the Muslim Jumu'ah ceremony, so it, in effect, bent
the rule to ensure that the inmates had some means of religious expression. One
commentator has remarked this reasoning amounts to an "improper expansion of
Turner," finding that the Court in Turner was more sensitive to absolute
deprivation of a prisoners' Free Exercise rights. "
The "alternative means" test, indeed, leads to a total deprivation when
applied to the specific Jewish practices of kashrut and abstaining from shaving
the beard. There is simply no alternative to keeping one's beard untouched or
observing kashrut. The Supreme Court, in an effort to provide an easy means
for prison officials to control their environment, unfortunately overlooked a
major problem in their "alternative means" test. The Court made no distinction
between voluntary religious exercises and obligatory religious practices. One
scholar has commented that under the Turner standard the lower courts have
indicated "a disturbing unwillingness or inability to closely examine the religious
practices involved."'7 6 Another scholar has questioned the "broad standards"
that do not allow for "distinguishing between claims and identifying situations
in which infringements of prisoners' fundamental individual rights of free
exercise of religion are significant."'" The practice of keeping kosher and
abstaining from shaving the beard are two such necessary obligations for which
171. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2262 (1987).
172. Id. at 90, 107 S. Ct. at 2262 (emphasis added).
173. OLone, 482 U.S. at 352, 107 S. Ct. at 2406.
174. Id. at 352, 107 S. Ct. at 2406 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 92, 107 S. Ct. at 2263).
175. Matthew P. Blischak, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz: The State of Prisoners'Religious Free
Exercise Rights, 37 Am. U. L. Rev. 453, 479 (1987).
176. Abramovsky, supra note 147, at 257.
177. David B. Tillotson, Comment, Free Exercise in the 1980's: A Rollback of Protection, 24
U.S.F. L. Rev. 505, 527 (1990).
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no alternatives exist. For Orthodox Jews, everyday observance of these beliefs
is essential to their existence. By not allowing Fromer or Friedman to grow their
beards, the courts forced them to defile the sacred word of God. By preventing
Ward and Cooper from eating kosher meals all day, the courts have caused them
to desecrate their diets, themselves, and their Lord.
These concerns have not been totally ignored by the courts. Justice Brennan,
dissenting in O'Lone, called for the resurrection of the Second Circuit's Wall
test 8 because the test asked "'whether the challenged restriction works a total
deprivation (as opposed to a mere limitation) on the exercise of that right."""
Justice Brennan found the concept of a complete deprivation of a Free Exercise
right central to one's faith, even in a prison system, to be abhorrent to the
Constitution. He explained with reference to Jumu'ah that, "[t]he ability to engage
in other religious activities cannot obscure the fact that the denial at issue in this
case is absolute: respondents are completely foreclosed from participating in the
core ceremony that reflects their membership in a particular religious communi-
ty."'80 Justice Brennan insisted that if a total deprivation results from a prison
regulation, then "more than [a] mere assertion" is necessary to deprive the prisoner
of the right. 8' In the cases discussed above, only the slightest of reasons was
found by the courts to be adequate justifications for the challenge of prison
regulations. In some cases mere speculation sufficed to find a rational relation to
a "legitimate penological objective."
Other courts have also noticed the problem oftotal deprivation ofan obligatory
religious practice. In the pre-Turner Fromer (II) decision, the Second Circuit,
employing the Wall test, stated that "'requiring [appellee] to cut his facial hair
would work a total deprivation of his religious belief that the beard must not be
disturbed."" 82  In Ward, the Ninth Circuit realized that there is a difference
"between a religious practice which is a positive expression of belief and a religious
commandment which the believer may not violate at peril of his soul."'" The
court remanded for findings regarding this distinction, stating that "[iut is one thing
to curtail various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative ways of
expressing belief may be found. It is another thing to require a believer to defile
himself, according to the believer's conscience, by doing something that is
completely forbidden by the believer's religion."'
Since the Turner decision, the Supreme Court and several lower federal
courts have failed to protect the obligatory religious practices of Orthodox Jewish
178. Described in Section II, supra.
179. O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 358, 107 S. Ct. 2400 2409 (1987) (quoting
Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1033 (2d Cir. 1985)).
180. Id. at 360, 107 S. Ct. at 2410.
181. Id. at 361, 107 S. Ct. at 2411.
182. Fromer (II), 817 F.2d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Fromer (), 649 F. Supp. 512, 518
(S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
183. Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 878 (9th Cir. 1993).
184. Id. at 878.
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prisoners. No "alternative means" exist to substitute for kashrut and abstention
from shaving. The courts can provide sufficient power and control to the
prisons, while at the same time upholding the constitutional rights of these
prisoners. Although it may not be a simple task, a line could be drawn between
regulations that completely deprive a prisoner of a central religious practice with
no adequate, religiously-sanctioned alternative and regulations that prevent
practices that are not essential to the religious observer. Perhaps, as one scholar
suggests, a more careful analysis by the courts would distinguish between a
religious practice with alternatives, such as the practice at issue in O'Lone, and
a practice with no alternative, such as abstaining from shaving one's beard.'8
While this alternative may lead to a "slippery slope" of other claimsof
"complete deprivation," it is better to err on the side of protection of rights
provided by the Constitution, than to deprive prisoners of simple requests that
hold so much meaning in their lives for the sake of speculative benefits to prison
officials.
V. RFRA AND BEYOND
Though the jurisprudence thus far appears to accept the Turner standard, a
new law may disrupt the present pattern. In 1993 Congress passed the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).'" RFRA originated with the United States
Supreme Court decision Employment Division v. Smith.'87 Essentially, the
Supreme Court in Smith denied two workers unemployment compensation for
digesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug ritualized by the Native American
Church. The plaintiffs argued, unsuccessfully, that this practice was protected
by the Free Exercise Clause. To many lawyers and laymen, the Supreme Court
in Smith discarded with the "compelling state interest" test utilized by the courts
in so many cases prior to Smith. In an attempt to turn back the clock on the
Supreme Court, Congress enacted RFRA.
RFRA states "[t]he Congress finds that... (4) in Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the
requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed
by laws neutral toward religion."' 88 RFRA then declares that its purpose is to
"restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)." '89 RFRA "applies
to all Federal and State law."' 90 RFRA, in effect, overrules Smith, and returns
the "compelling interest" standard to the realm of Free Exercise decisions.
185. Abramovsky, supra note 147, at 257.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
187. 494 U.S. 872, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)l (Supp. V 1993).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)l (Supp. V 1993).
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Like Smith, RFRA has had its share of critics. Although RFRA has been
applied with favorable results to Free Exercise claims,'19 some scholars believe
it is unconstitutional. The question that concerns this comment is the effect
the RFRA will have on the Free Exercise claims of prisoners. By its clear
wording, RFRA restores the "compelling state interest" test, instructing
government entities that this standard must be satisfied to burden a constitutional-
ly protected religious practice. Under RFRA, prisons must come up with strong
reasons to deny a prisoners' Free Exercise claim. This standard clearly makes
prisoners' claims more likely to succeed than the "reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests" test espoused in Turner.'93
Some commentators even believe RFRA has overruled Turner and its
progeny.'94 Others have looked to RFRA's legislative history to find its effect
on prisoners' rights. According to the House and Senate Reports, there was an
amendment to exclude prisoners' Free Exercise claims from RFRA, but it was
defeated in the Senate. One scholar's interpretation is that while O'Lone was not
a satisfactory standard, Congress was not ready to totally abandon the prior
policy of deference to the prison officials. 9' Another scholar has found that
the legislative history is "mired in ambiguity" and claims that only three facts
can be gleaned from the reports: "(1) the question of RFRA in prisons was
given explicit consideration; (2) the Congress rejected a prisons exception from
RFRA; and (3) RFRA is designed to impose a standard stricter than that of
O'Lone, but the ways in which it is to be stricter are not specified."' 9'
Whatever the effects RFRA will have on prisoners' Free Exercise claims, it is
191. Cheema v. Thompson, 36 F.3d 1102, 1994 WL 477725 (9th Cir. 1994) (sikh schoolchildren
allowed to wear ceremonial knife to class under certain school restrictions designed to promote
safety).
192. Three main constitutional issues that arguably have been created by the RFRA include:
1) that Congress misread the jurisprudence prior to Smith, and thus allows more rights than are
afforded by the Constitution itself; 2) that RFRA denies authority to the states to determine issues
of religious freedom; and 3) that Congress is overreaching its authority by telling the Supreme Court
to ignore their own opinion and interpret the Constitution through Congress' statute. See Christopher
L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional,
69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437 (1994). Other scholars argue that because Smith has been effectively replaced
with the RFRA, Smith can never be revisited, and therefore "Smith will survive in a placid
constitutional limbo." See Edward C. Lyons, Oregon v. Smith and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act: An Educational Perspective, 20 J.C. & U.C. 333, 335 (1994). Some postulate,
however, that the RFRA fits neatly into the constitutional scheme by fulfilling the "rachet theory"
of Congress' ability to require more, but not less, protection of a constitutional right than the
Constitution itself. See Rex E. Lee, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Legislative Choice and
Judicial Review, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 73 (1993).
193. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S. Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987).
194. Leon Friedman, New Developments in Civil Rights Litigation and Trends in Section 1983
Actions, 530 PLI Lit. and Admin. Pract. Course Handbook Series 317 (1995).
195. See generally Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act's Impact on Correctional Litigation, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 325 (1995).
196. Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171, 191 (1995).
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certain that some change is inevitable. If the "compelling state interest" test is
utilized by the courts, then more prison regulations will be found unconstitution-
al. Some commentators urge that RFRA be amended to exclude prisons from
its scope in order to avert strains on administrative costs as well as on inmate
tensions.'97 Others go so far as to claim RFRA will actually curtail prisoners'
religious freedom rights by forcing courts to more closely scrutinize prisoners'
sincerity in their religious beliefs. 9 '
For Orthodox Jewish prisoners, the application of RFRA to their claims
could only improve their present position. As shown above, when standards
even resembling a "compelling state interest" were applied to the kosher diet or
beard shaving claims, the claimant won.
I Prison systems, with a new burden to bear, may even change their policies
altogether. Perhaps, the idea of a flood of claims will force correctional systems
to adjust their regulations to accommodate more easily the special needs of their
prisoners. It appears that Orthodox Jewish prisoners now have a strong ally in
RFRA to combat the Turner effect.
VI. CONCLUSION
Before the Turner decision was handed down, most Orthodox Jewish
prisoners felt secure in believing that their religious practices would be protected
by the Constitution. The "compelling interest" standard that had developed in
the prior jurisprudence made it very difficult for prison officials to burden the
religious practices of kashrut and abstaining from shaving. The standard
enunciated in Turner and developed in O'Lone, however, turned the tables on
these prisoners. Now, the prison regulation was given a presumption of validity,
and needed only a "rational relation to a legitimate penological interest" to
burden prisoners' rights. This standard has not only been applied unevenly in
the lower courts, but has also failed to consider the difference between a
voluntary religious practice and an obligatory one. The result of this new
standard has denied Jewish prisoners these simple religious requests in almost
every instance. With the potential application of RFRA to these same issues,
however, perhaps these prisoners will be given a better, more equitable chance
to win their claims in court.
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